WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for  Conflict Diamonds by Pauwelyn, Joost
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 24 Issue 4 
2003 
WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the 
WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds" 
Joost Pauwelyn 
Duke University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the 
Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for 
"Conflict Diamonds", 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1177 (2003). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol24/iss4/12 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
WTO COMPASSION OR SUPERIORITY
COMPLEX?: WHAT TO MAKE OF THE WTO
WAIVER FOR "CONFLICT DIAMONDS"
Joost Pauwelyn*
A BSTRA CT ............................................................................................ 1177
I. IN TRODU CTION ....................................................................... 1178
II. COMMON SENSE IMPLICATIONS OF ENACTING A WAIVER ...... 1180
Il. WHY is THERE No WAIVER FOR TRADE RESTRICTIONS
BETWEEN KIMBERLEY PARTICIPANTS? ................ . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . 1182
A. Are Trade Restrictions Between Kimberley Participants
Justified Under GATTArts. XXI/XX
and/or the TBTAgreement? ............................................ 1183
B. If Restrictions Against Participants Are GA7T
Consistent, Why Are Not Restrictions Against
Non-Participants Consistent as Well? ............................. 1189
C. Does the Waiver Exclude Trade Between Participants
Because it Was Thought that as Between Participants
the Interlaken Declaration Itself Would Justify Any
W TO Violation? ............................................................... 1193
D. Conclusion on the Validity before a WTO Panel of
Trade Restrictions Related to Conflict Diamonds ........... 1196
IV. COMPASSION OR SUPERIORITY COMPLEX 9 ............. .. . . .. . . . .. . .. . . 1198
V. A TwO-TRACK ALTERNATIVE TO THE WAIVER PROCESS ...... 1203
V I. C ONCLU SION .......................................................................... 1205
E PILO G U E ............................................................................................ 1205
ABSTRACT
In May 2003, the WTO granted a waiver for trade restrictions im-
posed on WTO members not participating in the Kimberley Certification
Scheme combating so-called "conflict diamonds." This Article examines
the implications of this waiver decision. It argues that GATT/TBT provi-
sions may already excuse the trade restrictions at issue, especially now
that the UN Security Council has explicitly supported them. The waiver,
therefore, risks sending out the wrong signals, confirming a WTO "supe-
riority complex." At the same time, by excluding restrictions between
Kimberley participants from its scope, the waiver implies that WTO
members considered the Kimberley scheme to be a non-WTO instrument
* Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law, formerly with the Legal Af-
fairs Division and Appellate Body Secretariat of the WTO. Many thanks to Lorand Bartels,
Steve Chamovitz, Lothar Ehring, Sandy Levinson, Gabrielle Marceau and Joel Trachtman for
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1177
Michigan Journal of International Law
that could play a role before a WTO panel. This convergence of the
WTO treaty with other instruments of international law must be ap-
plauded. Yet, the same result could have been achieved by other, more
conciliatory means, such as an interpretative decision. Referring to other
recent examples, the Article concludes that WTO law should not take
other international negotiations hostage. The WTO treaty is of equal
value as other treaties. "Contracting out" of WTO rules by some WTO
members ought to be accepted as long as it does not affect the rights of
third parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Have you seen the latest James Bond movie? Then you probably re-
member the tragic story of "conflict diamonds." In Die Another Day,
diamonds were smuggled out of conflict-ridden Sierra Leone, in viola-
tion of a UN embargo, to be "reprocessed" into Icelandic diamonds and
exchanged, finally, for high-tech weapons in North Korea. James Bond,
of course, had his way of dealing with it on-screen. In early 2003, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) entered the picture in a less dramatic
way, yet, for the international lawyer, just as interesting. On May 15,
2003, WTO members granted a waiver for certain import and export re-
strictions on conflict diamonds.' WTO members listed in an annex to the
waiver decision2 (or who subsequently notify the WTO Council for
Trade in Goods) are excused for violations of certain articles of the
GATT3 with respect to measures "necessary to prohibit the export [and
import] of rough diamonds to [and from] non-Participants in the Kim-
berley Process Certification Scheme consistent with the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme. 4 Thus, the waiver thereby explicitly al-
lows countries to enact prohibitions that seem, at first glance, to be
1. WTO General Council, Proposed Agenda, WT/GC/W/498 (May 13, 2003) Item VI
[hereinafter Waiver Decision]. The text of the waiver can be found in the revised waiver re-
quest. WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds: Communication, G/C/W/432/Rev.1 (Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter
Revised Waiver Request]. For the original waiver, see WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Kim-
berley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds-Request for a Waiver, G/C/W/431
(Nov. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Waiver Request].
2. Revised Waiver Request, supra note 1, Annex at 3. WTO members listed in the
Annex to date are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Sierra Leone,
Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United States.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT Art. 1:1 prohibits discrimination between
WTO members (the so-called Most Favored Nation clause); GATT Art. XI: 1 prohibits quanti-
tative border restrictions such as import bans and quotas; GATT Art. XIII:I prohibits
discriminatory import quotas for cases where quotas are exceptionally allowed.
4. Revised Waiver Request, supra note I.
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inconsistent with general WTO rules. The waiver runs for 4 years start-
ing on January 1, 2003.'
The Kimberley Process sets up an international scheme of certifica-
tion to break the link between the trade in rough diamonds and armed
conflict, especially in African countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone,
and Liberia.6 The scheme sets out a certification requirement for rough
diamond exports to, and imports from, participants. Certification re-
quires certain minimum standards and aims to eliminate the presence of
conflict diamonds from all shipments to and from participants. Conflict
diamonds are:
rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to fi-
nance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as
described in relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other similar
UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as
understood and recognized in United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolu-
tions which may be adopted in future.'
With respect to trade with countries that do not participate in the
Kimberley scheme, participants should "ensure that no shipment of
rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a non-Participant."8 Put
simply, under the Kimberley scheme, trade between Kimberley partici-
pants is restricted to certified non-conflict diamonds only; trade between
Kimberley participants and non-participants is prohibited altogether.
The Kimberley scheme was formally adopted on November 5, 2002
in the Interlaken Declaration and became effective on January 1, 2003.'
The thirty-nine Kimberley participants reportedly account for 98% of
5. Pursuant to Article IX:4 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, however, the
waiver needs to be reviewed on an annual basis so as to check "whether the exceptional cir-
cumstances justifying the waiver still exist and whether the terms and conditions attached to
the waiver have been met". Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENT-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The latter test may provide interesting
debates in the years to come.
6. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Nov. 5, 2002), reprinted in Waiver
Request, supra note 1 at 4 [hereinafter Kimberley Scheme].
7. Id.§I.
8. Id. § 111(c).
9. Interlaken Declaration on 5 November 2002 on the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds, reprinted in Waiver Request, supra note 1, at 4 [hereinafter
Interlaken Declaration].
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production and global trade in rough diamonds.' Thirty-seven of the
thirty-nine Kimberley participants are also WTO members."
This Article examines what to make of this rather exceptional waiver
decision. Was it necessary in the first place? Why is the waiver limited to
trade with countries not participating in the Kimberley process? What
does this mean for trade restrictions imposed between Kimberley par-
ticipants? What does it say about the WTO consistency of other trade
restrictions taken for humanitarian purposes? Moreover, more generally,
what does this episode tell us about how WTO members perceive the
relationship between the WTO treaty and other instruments of interna-
tional law?
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Section II de-
tails the common sense implications of enacting a waiver. Section III
examines why it was decided that the waiver should not apply to trade
restrictions between Kimberley participants. Section IV, building on the
earlier discussion, asks whether the waiver is to be construed as an act of
"compassion" on behalf of the WTO membership or rather proof of what
will be described as a WTO "superiority complex." Finally, Section V
offers a two-track alternative to the waiver process for WTO members to
deal with the relationship between the WTO treaty and other instruments
of international law, be it the Kimberley scheme or other legal instru-
ments such as multilateral environmental agreements. The recurring
message in this Article is that the WTO treaty should not consistently be
used as an excuse to stalemate or water-down negotiations in other fora,
be it the Kimberley Process, the International Labor Organization, the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control or the Cartagena Pro-
tocol on Biosafety. 2
II. COMMON SENSE IMPLICATIONS OF ENACTING A WAIVER
Technically speaking, the act of granting a waiver is, of course, not
conclusive evidence that a measure benefiting from the waiver otherwise
10. WTO Goods Council Approves Kimberley Process Waiver, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG., Feb. 27, 2003, at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-02-27/story3.htm (last visited
Aug. 29, 2003).
1I. See Council Regulation 2368/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 358) 28 (implementing the Kim-
berley Process in the EC); see also The Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19 (2003)
(implementing effective measures to stop trade in conflict diamonds and for other purposes).
12. The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control was adopted unanimously
by the 56th World Health Assembly on May 21, 2003. WHO Framework Convention on To-
bacco Control, WHO Res. 56.1, 56th Assembly, Agenda Item 13, WHO Doc. WHA56.1
(2003), at http://www5.who.int/gb/EB.WHA/PDF/WHA56/ea56rl.pdf (last visited Aug. 28,
2003) [hereinafter FCTC]; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol].
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violates the WTO treaty. Although a waiver was granted, the measure in
and of itself could either be: (a) WTO consistent, and then there was no
need for a waiver in the first place; or (b) WTO inconsistent, in which
case the waiver effectively alters the character of the measure from "ille-
gal" to "legal."
Along these lines, the preamble to the waiver decision notes as fol-
lows: "this Decision does not prejudge the consistency of domestic
measures taken consistent with the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme with provisions of the WTO Agreement, including any relevant
WTO exceptions ... the waiver is granted for reasons of legal cer-
tainty.'
' 3
Nonetheless, once all WTO members decide by consensus to waive
WTO obligations for certain measures, it is difficult to resist the follow-
ing two common sense implications:
1) (Some) WTO members at least feared that the measures for
which the waiver was granted are inconsistent with WTO
rules; and
2) Closely related measures excluded from the waiver were
thought to be consistent with WTO rules (hence, there was no
need to include them in the waiver).
In this sense, what the diamond waiver does cover is as important as
what it does not cover.
Now, the May 2003 waiver only applies to measures "necessary to
prohibit the export [and the import] of rough diamonds to non-
',4Participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme." As a re-
sult, common sense would seem to imply that:
1) WTO members feared that restrictions on diamonds from
(and to) non-participants in the Kimberley Process could vio-
late WTO rules (hence the need for a waiver), whereas
2) Restrictions between Kimberley participants were thought to
be safe for WTO purposes (hence their exclusion from the
waiver).
13. Waiver Request, supra note 1, at 2. The request for the waiver confirms that a
waiver "will lend legal certainty to the relationship between those measures [outlined in the
Kimberley scheme] and the GATT 1994." Id. It is questionable, therefore, whether the waiver
request meets the requirement in paragraph I of the Understanding in Respect of Waivers of
Obligations under GATI 1994 that waiver requests must describe "reasons which prevent the
Member [in casu, Kimberley participants] from achieving its policy objectives by measures
consistent with its obligations under GATT 1994." Understanding In Respect of Waivers of
Obligations, Apr. 14, 1994, GATT, supra note 3, T 1.
14. Waiver Request, supra note 1, 1 t-2 (emphasis added).
Summer 2003]
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Especially in this case where the waiver was granted "for reasons of
legal certainty,"' 5 restrictions between participants were thus considered
not to implicate questions of legal certainty: those restrictions (as op-
posed to restrictions on non-participants) would survive a challenge
before a WTO panel; even a waiver to clear all doubts was thought un-
necessary.
III. WHY IS THERE No WAIVER FOR TRADE RESTRICTIONS
BETWEEN KIMBERLEY PARTICIPANTS?
There can be little doubt that Kimberley certification requirements,
once enacted by a WTO member for trade between Kimberley partici-
pants, will violate the restriction on quotas as stated in GATT Art. XI.
Art. XI outlaws all "prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes
or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or ex-
port licenses or other measures" on the trade between WTO members.'
6
Now, the very objective of the Kimberley requirements is to ban all trade
in a certain type of diamonds, namely conflict diamonds. Rough dia-
monds that are not certified cannot be traded. 7 Hence, the presence of a
quantitative restriction-an import ban-that is, prohibited under GATT
Art. XI. 8 Regardless of whether the Kimberley scheme is binding law or
15. But see id. pmbl. Recall that the preamble to the waiver decision leaves all possi-
bilities open when it "does not prejudge the consistency of domestic measures taken consistent
with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme with provisions of the WTO Agreement."
"Domestic measures" are not explicitly limited to those imposed as against non-participants
only.
16. GATT, supra note 3, art. XL.
17. See Kimberley Scheme, supra note 6, § IV(d) (stating that participants "should" (1)
"as required, amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the
Certification scheme", as well as (2) "maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for trans-
gressions"). The notice from the Kimberly Process Chairman makes this clear when stating
that "[d]uring the month of January 2003, Participants are requested not to take punitive action
against non-compliance ... Punitive action shall be exercised as from I February 2003." Ab-
bey Chikane, Kimberley Process Chairman, Notice 1/4 to All Kimberley Participants and
Observers (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Aug.
28, 2003).
18. One commentator expressed the view that the Kimberley scheme would not violate
GATT Art. XI since "the applicability of the Article XI is arguably limited to actions of one or
another Member, not to a multilateral initiative endorsed by the U.N. The use of the phrase
,any member' in Article XI and throughout the WTO Agreements indicates that the WTO
Agreements contemplate that trade measures that violate GATT occur when a certain Member
acts unilaterally, or even plurilaterally, but not multilaterally." Tracey Michelle Price, The
Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the Universality Debate, 12
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 53 (2003).
Of course, the Kimberley scheme as such, independent of the acts taken by WTO Mem-
bers, does not violate GATT Art. XI. But the scheme does call for the imposition of certain
trade restrictions by WTO members and those trade restrictions, once enacted, will violate Art.
1182 [Vol. 24:1177
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merely of a hortatory nature (an issue we address below 9), the fact re-
mains that if, and when, a participant enacts restrictions consistent with
the Kimberley scheme, such restrictions will violate GATT Art. XI.
20
So why was it thought that restrictions as between participants in the
Kimberley process would be safe when challenged before a WTO panel
(and hence, not need a waiver)? Two explanations can be found:
1) The WTO treaty itself justifies restrictions as between partici-
pants pursuant to GATT Art. XX and/or XXI and/or the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT);
2) Even if restrictions as between participants would not be jus-
tified under the WTO treaty itself, a WTO panel would still
excuse them based on the Interlaken Declaration in which all
participants adopted the Kimberley scheme.2
A. Are Trade Restrictions Between Kimberley Participants Justified
Under GATTArts. XXI/XX and/or the TBTAgreement?
That trade measures taken pursuant to the Kimberley scheme are jus-
tified under GATT exceptions-the first reason that could explain why
the waiver does not cover trade between participants-was the position
taken by a number of WTO members, in particular, the EC.22 It was also
the view expressed in the first Clean Diamond Act submitted to the US
Senate in 2002.23
XI. Nothing in the GATI limits the scope of GATT Art. XI to measures taken unilaterally or
pluralaterally. The fact that a measure is taken pursuant to a multilateral agreement may ex-
cuse a violation of GATT Art. XI; it will not prevent such violation from occurring in the first
place. GATT, supra note 3, art. XI.
19. See infra text accompanying note 68.
20. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XI. In addition to GATT Art. XI, restrictions on con-
flict diamonds-that is, diamonds originating in a particular country-would also constitute a
violation of the most-favored-nation principle in GATT Art. I, as it constitutes discrimination
between WTO members.
21. A third explanation for the limited scope of the waiver, of a political rather than a
legal nature (but for that reason not less plausible), could well be that Kimberley participants
did not fear or even envisage that other Kimberley participants would challenge Kimberley
restrictions before the WTO. For all practical purposes, it was felt that there was no need for a
waiver between participants. Be this as it may, the legal implications of, and other signals sent
out by, the limited scope of the waiver described below remain.
22. See WTO Goods Council Approves Kimberley Process Waiver, supra note 10 ("The
main disagreement stemmed from the fact that some countries did not see the need for a
waiver, as they considered GATT Article XXI (Security Exemptions) to cover issues such as
the Kimberley Process"); Press Release, European Union, EU welcomes WTO green light for
Kimberley System to block blood diamonds (May 15, 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/
commltrade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/prl60503_en.htm ("[Tlhere is no reason to believe
that a conflict between WTO rules and UN activities would have occurred").
23. See S. 2027, 107th Cong., § 2, T 7, 148 CONG. REC. 2012-13 (2002) ("Articles XX
and XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 allow members of the World
1183Summer 2003]
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In particular, GATT Art. XXI(c) seems to justify Kimberley restric-
tions. Art. XXI(c) reads as follows: "Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed ... (c) to prevent any WTO member from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
' 2
The question of conflict diamonds has been in the hands of the UN
Security Council for almost five years now.25 Each time, acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (on "Action with Respect to Threats to
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"), 6 the UN
Security Council has imposed embargoes on conflict diamonds from
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.27 All UN members must comply with
such embargoes. Unlike the Kimberley scheme-which, as will be dis-
cussed later, includes hortatory language28 -UN embargoes are legally
binding. Moreover, as UN Charter obligations, trade restrictions imposed
by the Security Council prevail over any other international agreement,
including the WTO treaty. Pursuant to Art. 103 of the UN Charter, UN
Charter obligations preempt all other international agreements. 9 GATT
Trade Organization to take measures to deal with situations such as that presented by the cur-
rent trade in conflict diamonds without violating their World Trade Organization obligations").
But see The Clean Diamond Act, supra note 11. Subsequently, the United States was one of
eleven WTO members requesting the waiver. The Clean Diamond Act that Congress passed in
April 2003, which the President signed in July 2003, no longer refers to the GATT consistency
of measures to combat conflict diamonds. Rather, it explicitly refers to the waiver that is pend-
ing at the WTO and even makes the effective date of the Act dependent on the date that the
WTO waiver enters into force.
24. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXI(c).
25. The first UN Security Council Resolution on the issue dates from June 1998. See
S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3891st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 173 (1998).
26. UN CHARTER ch. VII.
27. Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions are as follows. Angola: S.C. Res. 1173,
U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3891st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (1998); S.C. Res. 1176, U.N.
SCOR, 53d Sess., 3894th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1176 (1998); and S.C. Res. 1439, U.N.
SCOR, 57th Sess., 4628th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1439 (2002). Sierra Leone: S.C. Res. 1306,
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4168th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1306 (2000); S.C. Res. 1385, U.N.
SCOR, 56th Sess., 4442nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1385 (2001); and S.C. Res. 1446, U.N.
SCOR, 57th Sess., 4654th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1446 (2002). Liberia: S.C. Res. 1343, U.N.
SCOR, 56th Sess., 4287th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (2001); and S.C. Res. 1408, U.N.
SCOR, 57th Sess., 4526 mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1408 (2002). Paragraph I of UN Security
Council Resolution 1306 (2000) in respect of Sierra Leone, for example, declares that "all
States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough
diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory". S.C. Res. 1306, supra at 2. Importantly, in
light of the full implementation of the Lusaka and other peace accords, the Security Council
decided to lift the diamond embargo on Angola in December 2002. S.C. Res. 1448, U.N.
SCOR, 57th Sess., 4657th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1448 (2002). This means that diamonds
from Angola are now no longer considered to be conflict diamonds.
28. See infra text accompanying note 68.
29. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 (stating "[i]n the event of a conflict between the obliga-
tions of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
1184 [Vol. 24:1177
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Article XXI(c) merely confirms this preeminence of UN Security Coun-
cil obligations. Since the Kimberley scheme trade restrictions are limited
to conflict diamonds "as described" by the UN Security Council and "as
understood and recognized by" the UN General Assembly, it would, in-
deed, be more than likely that a WTO panel excuses those restrictions as
"action in pursuance of... obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security" in the sense of
GATT Art. XXI(c). After all, the Kimberley process was initiated by the
United Nations and both the UN General Assembly30 and the Security
Council have explicitly sup ported the Kimberley scheme.' Most re-
cently, in a January 28, 2003 resolution, the Security Council noted "the
decision made at the 5 November 2002 Interlaken Declaration on the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds" and de-
cided that it "[sitrongly supports the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme, as well as the ongoing process to refine and implement the re-
gime, adopted at the Interlaken Conference as a valuable contribution
against trafficking in conflict diamonds and looks forward to its imple-
mentation ...,32
Understanding this hierarchical relationship between UN Charter
obligations and the WTO, could one really expect a WTO panel to sec-
ond-guess a plethora of UN resolutions and decide for itself that trade
restrictions called for in the Kimberley scheme are not "action in pursu-
ance of ... obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security"?
3
In addition, arguments can be made that Kimberley trade restrictions
are justified also under GATT Art. XXI(b)(ii) and (iii). Art. XXI(b)(ii),
for example, justifies measures "relating to the traffic in arms,
ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods
and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
prevail"). This priority clause was confirmed by the ICJ with respect to Security Council reso-
lutions in Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Accident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.),
1992 I.C.J. 1,114 (Apr. 14) (Request for Provisional Measures).
30. See G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 175, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/55/56 (2001); G.A. Res. 56/263, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 37, U.N.
AIRES/56/263 (2002).
31. See S.C. Res. 1459, U.N. SCOR, 4694th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1459 (2003).
32. Id. 1l.
33. That WTO rules must, in this sense, give way to certain U.N. Security Council
resolutions, is confirmed also in the recent Clean Diamond Act, the U.S. implementing legisla-
tion for the Kimberley scheme. See The Clean Diamond Act, supra note 11. Section 15 of the
Act links the "effective date" of the Act to the date that either the WTO waiver enters into
affect or "an applicable decision in a resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations is in effect". Id. § 15. Given
the word "or", the Act could, therefore, enter into force even without the WTO waiver.
Summer 20031 1185
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supplying a military establishment. 34 The Kimberley Process would
seem exactly this type of measure. The UN, in a long series of resolu-
tions, has explicitly recognized that "conflict diamonds ... are used by
rebel governments to finance their military activities including attempts
to undermine or overthrow legitimate governments."35 As the Interlaken
Declaration points out, trade in conflict diamonds "can be directly linked
to the fuelling of armed conflicts ... and the illicit traffic in, and prolif-
eration of, armaments especially small arms and light weapons
36
(remember the Bond movie!). As a result, blocking the trade in conflict
diamonds could be seen as a measure "relating to the ... traffic in other
goods and materials [diamonds] as is carried on directly or indirectly for
the purpose of supplying a military establishment." To meet GATT Art.
XXI(b) conditions, Kimberley restrictions would then also have to fulfill
the chapeau of Art. XXI(b). That is, the regulating member must "con-
sider[] [the restriction] necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests." However, the language of this chapeau gives consid-
erable discretion to a particular member to define "its essential security
interests."37 In this case, where the UN Security Council has already
acted under Chapter VII, one could even argue that the security interests
of most, if not all, WTO members are at stake: conflict diamonds fuel
armed conflict, especially in Africa; hence, banning their trade should
help maintain international peace and security. Moreover, recent reports
have linked the trade in conflict diamonds to Al Qaeda, thereby extend-
ing the security threat of conflict diamonds well beyond Africa.38 This
connection with international terrorism can only embolden the argument
that a ban on conflict diamonds is, indeed, action "necessary for the pro-
tection of essential security interests" of many WTO members.
In addition to security concerns expressed in GATT Art. XXI, the
general exceptions in GATT Arts. XX(a) and (b) may also apply. These
provisions excuse measures "necessary to protect public morals" and
"human ... life or health." Although it may be more difficult to justify
34. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXI(b)(ii).
35. G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 30, at I.
36. Interlaken Declaration, supra note 9, pmbl.
37. See Peter Lindsay, GATT Article XXI: To Whom Does the Exception Belong?, 52
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2003); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability
for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and
Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L.
413, 420-32 (2001); Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization" and
Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 424, 431-37 (1999).
38. Sell diamonds for love, not war, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15 2001, at 26; Lucy Jones,
AI-Qaeda 'Traded Blood Diamonds', BBC NEWS ONLINE, Feb. 20, 2003, at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2775763.stm.
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the Kimberley restrictions under Art. XX than it is to excuse them under
Art. XXI (discussed earlier), the argument could be made that since con-
flict diamonds sponsor violent wars and systematic and gross human
rights violations, a WTO member should be permitted to keep those
diamonds out of its market, be it to protect the health and life of people
in Africa or to protect "public morals" in the importing country itself,
that is, by means of a trade restriction targeted at a practice that is shock-
ing to, for example, US (as well as, arguably, global) public morality.
The Art. XX(b) defense, in particular, could be more difficult to sustain
since the human life and health that would then be "protected" is located
outside the territory of the regulating country (that is, the life and health
of victims of armed conflicts in Africa). This would raise intricate ques-
tions of whether Art. XX has such extra-territorial reach and covers trade
restrictions based on so-called "process and production methods"
(PPMs) 9, as opposed to restrictions based purely on the physical features
of the products kept out (for instance, a technical regulation on the size,
color or weight of the diamonds).4 0 An additional complexity is that trade
restrictions on conflict that diamonds are not even traditionally under-
stood PPMs, but relate to features even further removed from the
physical characteristics of the traded product itself (here, the diamonds).
Indeed, conflict diamonds are banned not based on how they were pro-
duced (the way traditional PPMs operate), but on who mined or sold
them and how the profits procured by the diamonds were used. After all,
the distinguishing feature of conflict diamonds is that they are "used by
rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining
legitimate governments., 4' Note, in this respect, the EC is currently de-
fending a type of PPM restriction in a WTO dispute brought by India
against drug, environment and labor rights-related conditions built into
the EC's generalized system of preferences (GSP), that is, the EC system
set up to grant trade preferences, in particular tariff reductions, to devel-
42oping countries. India's view is that such conditioning of trade, based
on non-trade policies in the exporting country (for instance, does the
exporting country sufficiently respect the environment or labor rights
and does it cooperate in the battle against illegal drugs?), is unjustified
39. For example, how and in what circumstances were the diamonds mined?
40. See, e.g., Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction-An
Illusory Basis for Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 249
(2000); Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,
The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 353
(2002); Price, supra note 18.
41. Kimberley Scheme, supra note 6, § I.
42. WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of
India, WT/DS246/5 (Mar. 6, 2003).
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discrimination between developing countries.4 ' This ongoing procedure
may explain why the EC was one of the WTO members most vehe-
mently defending the GATT legality of the Kimberley scheme since if
one takes the view that Kimberley restrictions need a waiver, one may
imply that also more traditional PPMs or GSP conditionalities are incon-
sistent with WTO rules absent an explicit waiver."
Finally, in the event trade restrictions implementing the Kimberley
scheme were found to be "technical regulations" in the sense of the TBT
Agreement, WTO members enacting trade restrictions "in accordance
with" this scheme may benefit from a presumption of TBT consistency.
This would, however, raise the controversial question of whether Kim-
berley certification requirements and other trade restrictions lay down
"product characteristics or their related process and production meth-
ods" as required in the definition of "technical regulation" in Annex 1.1
of the TBT Agreement.45 If so, Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement pro-
vides that "[w]henever a technical regulation is prepared, adopted or
applied for one of the legitimate objectives explicitly mentioned in para-
graph 2 [which includes "national security requirements" and
"protection of human health or safety"], and is in accordance with rele-
vant international standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to
create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.'4 6 For purposes of
Article 2.5, Kimberley requirements could, indeed, be regarded as "rele-
vant international standards." As the panel on EC-Sardines found, for
TBT purposes, "[i]nternational standards are standards that are devel-
oped by international bodies." 7 Does the Kimberley scheme set out
"standards" and is the Kimberley process an "international body"? First,
the word "standard" is defined in Annex 1.2 as: "Document approved by
a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules,
43. European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to De-
veloping Countries, Request for Consultations by India, WT/DS246/l (Mar. 12, 2003).
44. See WTO Goods Council Approves Kimberley Process Waiver, supra note 10.
45. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 5, Annex I A, (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. Annex 1, paragraph
I specifies that the notion of "technical regulation" also covers documents that "deal exclu-
sively with ... packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product,
process or production method." Id. For Appellate Body statements on this definition, see the
WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and As-
bestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, IN 66-70 (2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos].
For example, the Appellate Body stated that "... . 'product characteristics' include, not only fea-
tures and qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but also related 'characteristics', such as the
means of identification, the presentation and the appearance of a product." Id. at T 67. See also
WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS23 I/AB/R, 9i 176-195 (2002).
46. TBT Agreement, supra note 45, art. 2.5 (emphasis added).
47. WTO Panel Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS23 I/R, $1 7.63 (2002).
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guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and pro-
duction methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.,48 Hence, the
fact that the Kimberley requirements are not mandatory could make
them "standards" in the TBT sense and, ironically, somewhat more im-
portant for TBT purposes since only compliance with international
"standards" offers a presumption of TBT conformity. Second, the word
"international body" is defined in Annex 1.4 as: "Body or system whose
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members. 49
Section VI.8 of the Kimberley scheme explicitly states, "[p]articipation
in the Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory basis
to all Applicants willing and able to fulfill the requirements of that
scheme."50 As a result, membership in the Kimberley Process "is open to
the relevant bodies of at least all [WTO] Members." Consequently, Kim-
berley requirements could well qualify as "international standards"
triggering a presumption of TBT conformity.
The above reasons could explain why WTO members, when enact-
ing the waiver, excluded restrictions on trade between Kimberley
participants: those restrictions were already justified under WTO rules.
Then--comes the obvious question-would these same GATT/TBT jus-
tifications not also justify restrictions against non-participants? Put
differently, if one is of the view that Kimberley restrictions between par-
ticipants are GATT consistent, what makes the same restrictions against
non-participants so different that they need a waiver?
B. If Restrictions Against Participants Are GATT Consistent,
Why Are Not Restrictions Against Non-Participants
Consistent as Well?
Compliance of diamond restrictions with GATT Arts. XX and/or
XXI should, in principle, not depend on whether the WTO member sub-
jected to the restriction is also a participant in the Kimberley process.
Rather, in those cases, compliance is determined through the very words
in Arts. XX and XXI,-by more or less objectively verifiable factors of
health protection, the involvement of national security interests, arms
trafficking, requirements in UN Security Council resolutions, etc.
Applied to the conflict diamonds situation, all of these factors have to do
48. TBT Agreement, supra note 45, Annex 1, 2 (emphasis added).
49. Id. Annex 1, 4.
50. Note also that in the event the TBT Agreement justifies a measure prohibited under
GATT, a "conflict" arises which must be resolved in favor of the TBT Agreement pursuant to
the General Interpretative Note to Annex IA. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,
WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex IA. See Joost Pauwelyn, Cross-agreement Complaints
Before the Appellate Body: A Case Study of the EC-Asbestos Dispute, 1 WORLD TRADE REV.
63 (2002).
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with the importing country and the nature or origin of the diamonds in
question, not with whether the exporting country is part of the Kimberley
scheme. Neither GATT Art. XX nor Art. XXI depend on the existence of
a bilateral or multilateral agreement with the specific country one is trad-
ing with to determine the GATT consistency of a trade restriction. GATT
Arts. XX and XXI also permit trade restrictions when no international
agreement exists between two trade partners. That is, after all, the very
reason why these provisions are there, namely to allow countries to re-
strict trade under certain conditions, such as national security, health,
etc., even if other countries do not perceive these risks in the same way.
Most importantly, for purposes of GATT Art. XXI(c) discussed ear-
lier, the Kimberley scheme itself includes both restrictions on
participants and the ban on all trade with non-participants. This scheme
was initiated and explicitly supported by both the UN Security Council
and the UN General Assembly.5' As a result, even if there remains a dif-
ference between the trade restrictions imposed on participants and non-
participants (in effect certified trade is permitted between the former and
no trade at all is allowed with the latter), this difference could, through
the Kimberley scheme, be said to be included in the "action" that is re-
quired "in pursuance of [WTO members'] obligations under the UN
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security"52 in the
sense of GATT Art. XXI(c). Hence, it could be argued, Art. XXI(c) justi-
fies restrictions on non-participants as much as it justifies restrictions on
participants.
Turning to the alternative defense under GATT Art. XX and the
question of whether this defense may also justify restrictions on non-
participants, the only instance in which the existence of bilateral or
multilateral negotiations with the exporting country (here, the non-
participants) could come into play is the chapeau of Art. XX. This
introductory phrase in Art. XX-a phrase that is, crucially, not included
in Art. XXI (which is, after all, the best defense for conflict diamond
restrictions)-prohibits "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail."53 The Appellate
Body in US-Shrimp considered that the failure to engage countries "in
serious across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding
bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection 54 of the objective
that one is concerned about (in US-Shrimp, sea turtles; here, breaking
51. See G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 30; G.A. Res. 56/263, supra note 30; S.C. Res.
1459, supra note 31.
52. GATF, supra note 3, art. XXI(c).
53. GATT, supra note 3, Id. art. XX, introductory paragraph.
54. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII 2755, T 166 (1998).
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the link between conflict diamonds and brutal violence), could constitute
discrimination against particular WTO members thus left out of negotia-
tions. When it comes to the elaboration of the Kimberley scheme,
however,-a process initiated by the United Nations and open to all
countries"-it would be difficult to conclude that any WTO member was
left out. As the second Appellate Body in US-Shrimp found, the regu-
lating country has to "provide all exporting countries 'similar
opportunities to negotiate' an international agreement"56 and is "expected
to make good faith efforts to reach international agreements that are
comparable from one forum of negotiation to the other."57 The universal
scope58 and repeated appeal by both the UN Security Council and Gen-
eral Assembly for all countries to participate in the Kimberley Process59
make it difficult to conclude that any WTO member was discriminated in
terms of good faith efforts to reach agreement on an international certifi-
cation scheme for conflict diamonds. After all, as the Appellate Body
noted, the good faith effort to reach an agreement is what counts; there is
no requirement that a multilateral agreement actually be concluded be-
fore one can validly impose Art. XX measures. If one were to impose
such a requirement, the Appellate Body added, this "would mean that
any country party to the negotiations with the [regulating country],
whether a WTO Member or not, would have, in effect, a veto over
whether the [regulating country] could fulfill its WTO obligations."
Hence, under GATT Art. XX as well, it could be argued that the fact
that a WTO member is not a Kimberley participant should not stop WTO
members from banning conflict diamonds imported from, or exported to,
such non-participant. In that sense, a conflict diamond is a conflict dia-
mond, no matter where it comes from or goes to.
6
1
55. See supra text accompanying note 50; G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 30; G.A. Res.
56/263, supra note 30; S.C. Res. 1459, supra note 31.
56. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW,
122 (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp--Recourse].
57. Id.
58. Section VI, paragraph 8 of the Kimberley scheme, as adopted in Interlaken, states
as follows: "Participation in the Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory
basis to all Applicants willing and able to fulfill the requirements of that scheme." Kimberley
Scheme, supra note 6, § VI, 8.
59. The preamble to the Interlaken Declaration states: "Emphasising that the widest
possible participation in the Certification Scheme is essential and should be encouraged and
facilitated. To that end, we invite all those involved in the trade in rough diamonds to join the
Process without delay and if possible before 1 January 2003." Interlaken Declaration, supra
note 9, pmbl. Similar language is set out in paragraph 3 of U.N. S.C. Res. 1459, supra note
31.
60. U.S.-Shrimp-Recourse, supra note 56, 123.
61. Since non-participants do not certify their diamonds, no diamonds from non-
participants can be conclusively proven to be conflict-free; hence, all trade with
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The same could be true for the TBT defense outlined earlier: trade
restrictions "in accordance with" Kimberley requirements-which could
be characterized as "relevant international standards"-offers WTO
members a presumption of consistency with the TBT Agreement. How-
ever, this presumption is triggered regardless of the Kimberley
requirement that a WTO member imposes, be it one against participants
or against non-participants. Both of these requirements are spelled out
clearly in the Kimberley scheme. Hence, both could be "international
standards" and equally justified for TBT purposes.6 2
Consequently, the case could be made that Kimberley restrictions
both between participants and against non-participants are WTO-
consistent, irrespective of a waiver, in particular, because GATT Art.
XXI(c) permits "action" that is required "in pursuance of [WTO mem-
bers'] obligations under the UN Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.' 63 As a result, the first reason that may
explain why the waiver only covers trade with non-participants-
namely, restrictions as between participants were considered as WTO
consistent, while those against non-participants were not-seems to be
in doubt. In terms of WTO consistency, there seems to be little differ-
ence between restrictions on participants and those on non-participants.
Hence, if WTO members really wanted to offer legal certainty with the
waiver, why did they not apply it equally to both types of restrictions?
This indicates that there may have been other reasons to distinguish re-
strictions on participants from those on non-participants. This leads us to
the second reason that could explain why the waiver only covers trade
with non-participants: the Interlaken Declaration as an independent de-
fense to be invoked before a WTO panel.
non-participants must be banned. If not, the entire scheme would collapse, since anyone could
simply import, export or even re-export conflict diamonds from, or to, any non-participant and
thereby circumvent the entire certification scheme. In order to re-enter the diamond trade,
non-participants would have to abide by international certification requirements. As a result,
all WTO members can continue to trade in diamonds without discriminating against anyone.
62. An additional question that may then arise is whether a complete ban on diamonds
from non-participants still qualifies as a "technical regulation." The Appellate Body in EC-
Asbestos, overturning the Panel, found that an import ban on asbestos fibers cannot be exam-
ined in isolation of exceptions to this ban, but must be assessed rather as an "integrated
whole" under the TBT Agreement. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 45, 64. At the same time,
the Appellate Body also seemed to imply that a pure ban, without any further regulation, may
not be a "technical regulation" falling under the TBT Agreement, stating: "This prohibition on
these [asbestos] fibres does not, in itself, prescribe or impose any 'characteristics' on asbestos
fibres, but simply bans them in their natural state. Accordingly, if this measure consisted only
of a prohibition on asbestos fibres, it might not constitute a 'technical regulation.'" Id. at 1 71
(emphasis in original).
63. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXI(c).
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C. Does the Waiver Exclude Trade Between Participants
Because it Was Thought that as Between Participants
the Interlaken Declaration Itself Would
Justify Any WTO Violation?
Could the exclusion from the waiver of restrictions between partici-
pants be explained by another reason: a growing acceptance that a WTO
panel would accept trade restrictions between participants based on the
Interlaken Declaration itself (and this even if those restrictions would not
be justified under WTO rules as such)? In other words, did WTO mem-
bers worry about the WTO conformity of both Kimberley restrictions on
participants and non-participants? And did they only stop worrying
about restrictions on participants, not because of some distinction under
WTO rules themselves (as we pointed out, for purposes of WTO consis-
tency, the two types of restrictions seem little different), but because
those restrictions had already been explicitly accepted by WTO mem-
bers that are also Kimberley participants in the Interlaken Declaration.
As a result, there was no further need to confirm this acceptance in the
WTO waiver.
This raises the question of whether WTO panels could refer to a
non-WTO treaty or declaration as an excuse not to abide by WTO rules.
Put differently, if a WTO panel were to find that Kimberley restrictions
between participants violate WTO rules and cannot be excused under
any GATT/TBT exception (contrary to our earlier analysis), could that
panel still find that the WTO violation is justified based on another, non-
WTO instrument agreed upon by both disputing parties, in this case, the
Kimberley scheme as it applies between participants? Elsewhere, I have
argued that WTO panels should be permitted to do so, as long as three
criteria are met: 1) the non-WTO instrument was agreed upon by both
disputing parties; 2) the restriction does not affect the rights and obliga-
tions of third parties; and 3) the subsequent international agreement can
be said to prevail over the WTO treaty either as the later in time or the
more specific norm dealing with the particular facts. ' In the present
case, the outcome would be that after agreeing to trade restrictions in the
Kimberley scheme, one Kimberley participant couldn't revert to the
WTO to sue another Kimberley participant who implemented that
scheme, only to seek the withdrawal of a restriction both parties just
agreed to.
However, under this line of thinking, there is a crucial distinction be-
tween Kimberley restrictions on participants and non-participants: the
Interlaken Declaration can only be invoked as a defense against WTO
64. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001).
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members that agreed to the declaration in the first place; it cannot be
relied upon against a WTO member that did not accept it. Hence, the
Interlaken Declaration offers an excuse for restrictions on participants,
not for restrictions on non-participants. This may, in turn, have con-
vinced WTO members to enact the waiver only for trade restrictions on
non-participants.65 If this is indeed what WTO members had in mind, or
what must be logically inferred from the waiver, then the waiver consti-
tutes an important recognition of the role of non-WTO instruments
before a WTO panel.
Still, two problems arise in construing the Interlaken Declaration as
a non-WTO instrument that could override the WTO treaty as between
its participants.
First, although the Interlaken Declaration was formally adopted and
this declaration, in turn, "adopted" the Kimberley scheme66 , the "under-
takings in respect of the international trade in rough diamonds"67 use
hortatory language, more particularly, the word "should," instead of
"shall. '68 As a result, it may be difficult to read the Interlaken Declaration
as an instrument "contracting out" of certain WTO obligations, in par-
ticular GATT Art. XI not to impose quantitative restrictions. How, one
could argue, can a prohibition to impose a trade ban (in Art. XI) be "con-
tracted out," or overruled, by hortatory language (in the Interlaken
Declaration) calling upon countries that they "should" ban the trade in
non-certified diamonds?
Here is a possible answer: the language in the Interlaken Declaration
may not impose legally binding obligations that can be enforced as be-
tween participants. In this sense, one participant could trade diamonds
with another participant without requiring certification and, strictly
speaking, not breach international law. The fact that the "obligations" in
the Kimberley scheme are, thereby, not legally enforceable is one thing.
An altogether different question is, however, whether the Kimberley
scheme may nonetheless confer certain rights (even if it does not impose
obligations).
65. Note that also WTO members who are not participating in the Kimberley process
can be added to the list of WTO members that can rely on the waiver. Revised Waiver Request,
supra note 1, $ 3.
66. Interlaken Declaration, supra note 9, 1.
67. Kimberley Scheme, supra note 6, § 3.
68. This leads most participants to the conclusion that the Kimberley scheme is "volun-
tary." See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CRITICAL
ISSUES REMAIN IN DETERRING CONFLICT DIAMOND TRADE 56 (2002) (including the State
Department's observation of "the voluntary nature of the system ... Launching the scheme
early on a voluntary basis would not preclude future legally binding actions. However, legally
binding agreements take significantly longer time to develop and bring into effect.").
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Could it, indeed, not be said that although a participant cannot be
"forced" to require certification (since the scheme refers to "should," not
"shall"), a participant who is doing exactly what is called for under the
scheme is exercising a right that was explicitly conferred to it? This right
under the scheme could then be said to prevail over an earlier, and more
general, obligation in the WTO treaty. In sum, although a non-WTO in-
strument does not impose legally binding obligations, the fact that it
calls upon participants to impose certain restrictions could still be con-
strued as the grant of an explicit right that may, pursuant to conflict rules
of public international law,69 prevail over an obligation in the WTO
treaty. Put differently, should a Kimberley participant, who is involved in
a WTO dispute with another participant, not be permitted to insist that
although its trade restrictions may violate WTO rules, the other party
itself agreed to those trade restrictions when it adopted the Kimberley
scheme and cannot now revert to something agreed upon earlier in the
WTO? A panel would then give priority to the Kimberley scheme not
because it considers that this scheme is, for example, necessary to
achieve the objective of national security or protection of human health
and life (as it would do under GATT Arts. XXI/XX) but because the
complainant, now challenging the restrictions, itself agreed to this
scheme in the first place.
A second problem with reading the Interlaken Declaration as a form
of "contracting out" of the WTO treaty as between participants, is para-
graph 3 of the Interlaken Declaration, which reads as follows: "We will
ensure that the measures taken to implement the Kimberley Process Cer-
tification Scheme for rough diamonds will be consistent with
international trade rules. 7°
If participants were engaging in a "contracting out" of the WTO
treaty, why would they state that implementation measures must be
"consistent with international trade rules"?7'
69. 1 described those conflict rules (including the "later in time" rule, and the rule that a
more specific provision prevails over a more general one) elsewhere. See JOOST PAUWELYN,
CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); see also infra text accompanying note 90; C. Wilfred
Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 1953 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 401; Michael Akehurst,
The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 1974-1975 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273.
70. In addition, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme recognized that "the inter-
national certification scheme for rough diamonds must be consistent with international law
governing international trade." Kimberley Scheme, supra note 6, pmbl. See also G.A. Res.
56/263, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 96th plen. mtg., 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/263 (2002) (em-
phasizing "the importance of ensuring that the measures taken to implement the international
certification scheme for rough diamonds are consistent with international law governing inter-
national trade").
71. Interlaken Declaration, supra note 9, 3.
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One way to explain this apparent contradiction could be to say that
paragraph 3 was meant to refer only to trade restrictions against non-
participants; that Kimberley participants were worried only about the
WTO consistency of those restrictions since they would not be agreed
upon by both parties in a WTO dispute (as opposed to the trade restric-
tions between participants agreed upon under the scheme and hence
safely overruling any prior WTO obligation as between participants).
After all, paragraph 3 of the Interlaken Declaration does not state that
the Kimberley scheme leaves the WTO treaty untouched or must give
way to the WTO treaty.72 On the contrary, it seems to imply that a prob-
lem of WTO consistency may arise in the implementation of the
scheme.73 Hence, the participants "will ensure that" implementing meas-
ures "will be consistent with international trade rules. 74 Asking for a
WTO waiver, as they did, would seem to be part of the fulfillment of this
promise. Hence, the reference in the Interlaken Declaration and other
related instruments to rules on international trade, as well as the per-
ceived need for the waiver, confirm that the Kimberley scheme was seen
as problematic under WTO rules. However, this, one could argue, is how
they resolved the problem: between participants, the Interlaken Declara-
tion itself settles the question; against non-participants, the waiver clears
all doubts.
D. Conclusion on the Validity before a WTO Panel of Trade
Restrictions Related to Conflict Diamonds
Above, we discussed two possible reasons why the waiver excludes
restrictions as between Kimberley participants: (1) WTO rules, in and of
themselves, justify those restrictions; (2) if any WTO violation remains,
72. In this regard, see S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4168th mtg., 9, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1306 (2002). The Security Council, concerned with the rough diamond trade with
Sierra Leone, called upon "all States ... and all relevant international and regional organiza-
tions [including, it would seem, the WTO] to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of
this resolution notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed
by any international agreement." Id.
73. After all, during the negotiations of the Kimberley scheme a special Working Group
on WTO compliance issues (under the chairmanship of the US) was created. Although many
countries confirmed the consistency of the scheme with the WTO (in implementing legislation
or before the WTO itself, see supra notes 22, 23), concern was raised at other times and places
about WTO compliance. In March 2002, Kimberley participants met to resolve "outstanding
technical issues." At the top of the list was the compatibility of the scheme with WTO rules.
See Kimberley Process Meeting, Ottawa Final Commnuniqui (Mar. 18-20, 2002), at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/news/documents.asp?d=35 (last visited Aug. 29, 2003);
see also U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 68, at 18 ("[W]hether national imple-
mentation of this provision [on trade with non-participants] will comply with trade agreements
such as those under the [WTO] has been a point of contention since early in the process and
remains under discussion.").
74. Interlaken Declaration, supra note 9, $ 3.
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the Interlaken Declaration excuses them between its participants. We
saw that the first reason, on its own, is not very convincing since, given
the circumstances, little difference exists in terms of WTO conformity
between restrictions on participants and those on non-participants, leav-
ing more or less equal amounts of certainty/uncertainty for both. Hence,
if WTO members really wanted to provide legal certainty with the
waiver, why did the waiver single out restrictions against non-
participants? This led to a potential second reason for the waiver's
limited scope: the Interlaken Declaration as an independent defense
before a WTO panel. Although there are some problems with this second
explanation, given the shaky nature of the first, this second explanation
may have carried more weight. If this assessment were correct, then
surely the waiver is an important step in the gradual process of WTO
members recognizing the independent value of non-WTO instruments
before a WTO panel.
In any event, irrespective of why WTO members thought that Kim-
berley restrictions between participants would survive scrutiny before a
WTO panel (and thus left them out of the waiver), it seems unavoidable
that this should be the case, notwithstanding their exclusion from the
waiver. If not, one would end up with the rather absurd result that restric-
tions against non-participants are WTO consistent (since falling under an
explicit waiver), whereas restrictions between participants are not. In this
sense, the waiver does not achieve its stated objective of legal certainty:
although, in my view, restrictions between participants ought to survive
panel scrutiny, this is not guaranteed. Even with respect to trade with
non-participants (the only type covered by the waiver) there is no legal
certainty since the waiver does not apply to restrictions imposed by all
participants, but only to those that put their name in the Annex to the
waiver. So far, only 11 of the 37 participants that are also WTO members
have done so."
Does this mean that all trade restrictions imposed to deal with con-
flict diamonds are now safe under WTO rules? Surely not. Regarding
non-participants, the waiver only covers restrictions "consistent with the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme" imposed by WTO members
listed in the annex to the waiver. On the other hand, with respect to par-
ticipants, the independent defense offered by the Interlaken Declaration
itself can only cover restrictions explicitly called for in the Kimberley
scheme itself. All other restrictions-not explicitly covered in the waiver
or not explicitly called for in the Kimberley scheme-will need to be
75. See supra text accompanying note 2. Recall also that for a WTO member to be
listed in the Annex there is no need for it to be a Kimberley participant, see supra text accom-
panying note 65.
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carefully scrutinized especially under GATT Arts. XXI and XX. The
waiver decision itself makes it clear that dispute settlement procedures
continue to apply. Paragraph 7 states: "This waiver shall not preclude the
right of affected Members to have recourse to Articles XXII and XXIII
of the GATT 1994."76 Kimberley participants "can identify and decide on
additional verification measures to be undertaken," that is, restrictions
not explicitly called for in the scheme." However, according to the
scheme, "such measures are to be implemented in accordance with ap-
plicable national and international law.9
78
IV. COMPASSION OR SUPERIORITY COMPLEX?
There can be no doubt that WTO members enacted the conflict dia-
monds waiver for the noblest of intentions. The trade in conflict
diamonds is a scourge that must be stopped, both to prevent brutal wars
and humanitarian disasters in Africa and to protect the world against ter-
rorism. In this sense, for the WTO to explicitly recognize the importance
of putting an end to this trade is surely a humanitarian act of "compas-
sion." It shows the human face of the much-maligned WTO.
Systemically, the waiver also demonstrates the widening horizon of
WTO negotiators, a horizon that stretches increasingly beyond purely
trade and economic matters to include also human values and priorities
as they are expressed in instruments negotiated outside the WTO.79 In
this sense, as well, the waiver could be seen as proof that the WTO is
"com-passionate" for things happening outside the four corners of the
WTO building in Geneva. Moreover, the waiver confirms that the legis-
lative function of the WTO is not completely deadlocked and can
actually provide solutions without having to go to dispute settlement.0
All of this must be applauded.
At the same time, however, it is questionable whether the WTO had
to enter into this debate in the first place, especially by way of granting a
waiver. It risks sending two wrong signals. First, it seems to imply that
without the waiver, trade restrictions on conflict diamonds would be in-
76. Waiver Decision, supra note I, 7.
77. Id.
78. Kimberley Scheme, supra note 6, § 6, 13 (emphasis added).
79. For example, Pascal Lamy, EU trade commissioner, made the following statement
in response to the diamond waiver: "The WTO green light should be welcomed as a clear
demonstration of coherence among international rules. It shows that WTO rules are suffi-
ciently flexible to accommodate the implementation of a UN mandated activity. Carefully
drafted trade measures can and do support development." EU press release, supra note 22.
80. For a recent discussion, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Tensions between the dispute
settlement process and the diplomatic and treaty-making activities of the WTO, I WORLD
TRADE REV. 301 (2002).
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consistent with WTO rules. This paper has contested this implication,
arguing that WTO provisions may justify restrictions both between Kim-
berley participants and against non-participants. Beyond the question of
conflict diamonds, the presumption of illegality thus raised by the waiver
may, more generally, hamper the further development of GATT excep-
tions, especially to the extent that these exceptions may cover trade
restrictions for humanitarian purposes or restrictions based on so-called
process or production methods (PPMs).
A second misguided signal implied in the waiver is the presumption
that whatever is agreed upon outside the WTO--be it in the United Na-
tions or the Kimberley Process-must still be reconfirmed in the
precinct of the WTO itself for it to have any value before WTO organs,
as if other instruments of international law can never add to or override
the WTO treaty. This relates to what I called in the title of this Article the
WTO's "superiority complex." I term it a superiority "complex" because
I do not honestly believe that either the staff of the WTO secretariat or
the government delegates running WTO business are in any way arro-
gant or feel openly superior. After all, it is the same countries, and
sometimes (though not often) even the same delegates, who negotiate
both WTO instruments and other instruments outside the WTO. It is,
rather, a superiority "complex" in that it is hidden, yet difficult to sup-
press, causing a constant fear that whatever is agreed upon outside the
WTO must be double-checked for consistency with WTO rules, as if
WTO rules are somehow of a superior order or norms that cannot be de-
viated from except by means of a waiver. The conflict diamonds
example offers an extreme case of this superiority complex in that it re-
lates to action called for by the UN Security Council, an organ that is
recognized as superior not only in Article 103 of the UN Charter but also
in Art. XXI(c) of the GATT itself.
However, this WTO superiority complex seems to be reoccurring. It
was omnipresent in all recent international negotiations with a trade
component, be it the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (regarding the in-
ternational transport of living modified organisms produced through
modern biotechnology"), the Kimberley Process, or the WHO Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control (imposing, among other things,
81
restrictions on the sale and advertising of tobacco products). It is re-
flected also in the debates concerning the International Labour
Organization (ILO) resolution of June 2000 recommending action
81. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 12. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, A
Nexus of Trade and the Environment: The Relationship Between the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety and the SPS Agreement of the WTO, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2003).
82. See FCTC, supra note 12.
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against Myanmar/Burma for its persistent violation of core labour stan-
dards.83 In that debate, the question is often raised whether a trade
embargo on Myanmar would not be prohibited by WTO rules, as if
WTO rules are completely de-linked from, and afortiori superior to, an
explicit and quite unique 1LO recommendation to take action (the first
since the ILO's inception in 1919!). In the Biosafety Protocol, for exam-
ple, this superiority complex, viewing WTO rules as almost
"constitutional" in nature, combined with an obvious desire to give effect
to the new protocol, led to the following much belaboured preambular
clauses which effectively cancel each other out: "Emphasizing that this
Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and
obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements; Un-
derstanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this
Protocol to other international agreements."8
As I have argued elsewhere," it is wrong to regard WTO provisions
as commandments that are written in stone and can only be overcome by
a consensus of all WTO members. WTO members must be allowed to
"contract out" of WTO provisions or give preference to other instru-
ments that they consider as more important, as long as they do not
thereby affect the rights and obligations of third parties. Given the essen-
tially "bilateral" nature of WTO obligations, such "contracting out"
without affecting third parties should even be easier and more acceptable
under the WTO treaty than it is under other treaties, such as those on
human rights or the environment, which are often of an erga omnes
partes nature. As a result, WTO members negotiating treaties outside the
WTO should not worry about contradicting WTO provisions as long as
such contradictions affect only the rights and obligations of WTO mem-
bers that are party to the new treaty. In this sense, negotiators should stop
using the WTO as a scapegoat that allegedly forces them to stalemate or
water-down commitments entered into elsewhere.
Fortunately, however (at least for the purpose of bringing together
WTO and other instruments of international law), the waiver on conflict
diamonds does not cover restrictions between Kimberley participants.
This exclusion constitutes an important qualification and may actually
neutralize much of the second "wrong signal" described above. Indeed,
83. Resolution (1) concerning the measures recommended by the Governing Body un-
der article 33 of the ILO Constitution on the subject of Myanmar, Int'l Labor Conf., 88th
Sess. (2000), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc88/resolutions.htm
(last visited Aug. 29, 2003). For recent action on this subject in the United States, see Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, S. 1215, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
84. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 12, pmbl.
85. Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obliga-
tions Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2003).
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by excluding trade restrictions that had already been agreed upon by
some WTO members in the Kimberley Process, the WTO seems to rec-
ognize that such agreement-albeit one reached outside the WTO-is
sufficient, in and of itself, to overcome any problems of WTO consis-
tency before a WTO panel. If this is the case, the waiver-although
generally inspired by the superiority complex described earlier-may, in
its details, actually be an important departure from WTO tradition and a
crucial first step in healing this WTO malaise.
Another indication that the WTO's superiority complex is under at-
tack can be found in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC), adopted on 21 May 2003.86 The June 2002 draft of this
convention included two provisions relevant to its relationship with the
WTO treaty (and, following the superiority complex described earlier,
giving clear deference to WTO rules).87 First, Article 2.3 provided:
"Nothing in this Convention and its related protocols shall be interpreted
as implying in any way a change in rights and obligations of a Party un-
der any existing international treaty."8 Second, Article 4.5 stated as
follows, "[w]hile recognizing that tobacco control and trade measures
can be implemented in a mutually supportive manner, Parties agree that
tobacco control measures shall be transparent, implemented in accor-
dance with their existing international obligations, and shall not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in interna-
tional trade."'89
These draft provisions would, therefore, have subjected the new to-
bacco convention to any pre-existing WTO rules. Once again, the
perceived superiority of the WTO treaty seemed poised for triumph.
Still, both provisions were deleted from the text in the next draft as well
as in the final FCTC convention. In what is, effectively, a complete
U-turn, the chair of the intergovernmental negotiating body explained
this change as follows:
Although these paragraphs [Articles 2.3 and 4.5] highlight an
important issue, there is no need to include them as specific pro-
visions in the framework convention since these matters are
adequately addressed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Additionally, the preamble reiterates the paramount
importance of health ... In international law, there is no in-built
86. See FCTC, supra note 12.
87. See New Chair's Text of a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO Inter-
governmental Negotiating Body on the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 5th
Sess., at 5, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB5/2 (2002), at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc (last visited
Aug. 29, 2003).
88. Id. art. 2.3.
89. Id. art. 4.5.
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hierarchy between different' types of treaties. This means that in
principle, the framework convention on tobacco control, once
entered into force will have the same standing as any other in-
ternational treaty. The relationship between successive treaties
dealing with the same subject matter is addressed by customary
international law and is in part codified in Article 30 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In the event of a
conflict between two treaties that do not contain provisions as to
their respective priority, there are two fundamental rules:
1) the more recent treaty will be applied in precedence over the
older one; and
2) the more specific treaty will be applied in precedence over the
more general one.90
Consequently, instead of explicitly stating the superiority of the
WTO treaty over the new tobacco convention (as the June 2002 draft
did), the final text of the FCTC confirms the inherent equality between
the WTO treaty and the new FCTC. The final text refers to general rules
of international law-in particular, the lex posterior and lex specialis
principles-to resolve any conflicts. In essence, in the event a conflict
were to arise (an eventuality that is far from certain), the FCTC, being
both later in time and more specific (at least to the extent it deals with
trade in a specific product, tobacco), will normally prevail over the WTO
treaty; albeit, of course, only between countries that are party to both
treaties.
Though hijacked for quite some time over concerns of its conformity
with WTO rules, the FCTC thus offers another crucial indication that the
days of perceived WTO superiority may be waning. A more general cure
for this complex may be in sight, in the form of a firm recognition that
the WTO treaty is just like any other treaty and that a WTO panel, when
examining a claim of violation of WTO rules, ought to take cognizance
also of norms that the disputing parties agreed upon elsewhere, outside
of the WTO, as long as those outside rules do not affect third party
rights.
90. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Letter from Ambassador Luiz Felipe
de Seixas Corrda, Chair, hitergovernmental Negotiating Body, WHO Intergovernmental Nego-
tiating Body on the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 6th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 3, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB6/3 Rev.! (2003), at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/
PDF/inb6/einb63rl .pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Ambassador Letter]. See also
infra text accompanying note 93.
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V. A TWO-TRACK ALTERNATIVE TO THE WAIVER PROCESS
What alternatives did WTO members have in dealing with the con-
flict diamonds issue? If WTO members really insisted on providing legal
certainty that Kimberley restrictions would survive a WTO panel (as
noted earlier, an objective they did not fully achieve with the current
waiver), 9' they could have chosen the following two-step alternative. This
option may also be useful to regulate the interaction between WTO rules
and multilateral environmental agreements, a topic currently part of the
Doha Round of Negotiations."
First, in the Kimberley scheme itself participants (all but two of
which are WTO members) could have stated explicitly that, in the event
of conflict, the Kimberley scheme (as both the later in time and the more
specific treaty) prevails over WTO rules. This simply reconfirms the ex-
isting rule in case a later treaty remains silent on the issue as did, for
example, the WHO tobacco convention discussed in the previous sec-
tion. The lex posterior rule in Art. 30 of the Vienna Convention, states
that the later treaty (in casu, the Kimberley scheme) prevails. Obvi-
ously, such a clause would have worked only between participants in the
scheme. As noted before, the rights of third parties, in casu the WTO
rights of non-participants in the scheme, cannot be affected. Second, in
the WTO, instead of granting a waiver, WTO members could have
adopted an authoritative interpretation of GATT Art. XXI (or, less likely,
of GATT Art. XX). This is, in effect, what WTO members did (in all but
form) with respect to certain TRIPS provisions as they relate to the
problem of access to essential medicines. In the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the WTO membership stated, "the
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from tak-
ing measures to protect public health.., in particular, to promote access
to medicines for all. 94 It was agreed, more specifically, that "public
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
91. See supra text accompanying note 75.
92. See WTO Ministerial Declaration, 6,31(l), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I (Nov. 14, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist-e/mindecl-e.htm (last visited May 9,
2003).
93. The chair of the body negotiating the FCTC, after detailing why the draft provisions
giving superiority to the WTO treaty were dropped (see supra text accompanying note 90),
explained the complete absence of conflict clauses in the new convention as follows: "In cases
where there is potential conflict between two treaties, to which the vast majority of States are
parties, States will normally have an interest in implementing both treaties rather than in em-
phasizing potential conflicts and in establishing a fixed rule of priority. It can therefore be seen
as counterproductive to give precedence to one treaty over the other." Ambassador Letter,
supra note 90.
94. Draft Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Confer-
ence, WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., T 4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14, 2001).
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malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency"95 for which the TRIPS Agreement
itself provides exceptions to patent rights. A similar decision could have
been made for conflict diamonds. WTO members could have stated sim-
ply "measures regulating or prohibiting the export and import of rough
diamonds necessary to implement the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme will be presumed to fall under the exception in GATT
Art. XXI."
Importantly, such interpretative decision would cover restrictions,
both among participants and against non-participants.96 Like a waiver
decision, it could have been enacted by a three-fourths majority decision
pursuant to paragraph 2 (not paragraph 3) of Article IX of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO.97 However, unlike the waiver which
implied the existence of WTO violations but for the waiver (thereby con-
firming the WTO's superiority complex), an interpretative decision
would have sent the unmistakable signal that exceptions in WTO rules
already permit trade restrictions to deal with outrageous activities such
as extracting money from diamonds to pursue brutal wars and sponsor
terrorism. In addition, an interpretation would have offered 100% legal
certainty, where (in theory) the waiver, which only covers non-
participants, still leaves some doubt (hopefully dispelled in this paper) as
to whether the restrictions between participants would survive scrutiny
before a WTO panel.
Finally, however, the waiver was, in a sense, the easy way out: by
stating that the waiver "does not prejudice the [WTO] consistency of
domestic measures taken consistent with" the Kimberley scheme, WTO
members avoided taking any explicit position on the WTO consistency
of Kimberley restrictions absent the waiver. An authoritative interpreta-
tion, in contrast, would have required positive resolve to agree that
Kimberley restrictions do fall under GATT exceptions. Yet with more
convincing by those countries adamant about the capacity of existing
WTO rules to embrace and justify such restrictions, an interpretative de-
cision on conflict diamonds could have contributed to the much needed
refinement and development of GATT exceptions (which were, after all,
95. td., $ 5(c).
96. Instead of an interpretative decision to the effect that Kimberley restrictions would
fall under GATT exceptions, WTO members could also agree on a conflict clause giving prior-
ity to the Kimberley scheme in the event of conflict with WTO rules, along the lines of Article
104 of NAFTA in respect of the relationship between NAFTA and certain multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992,
art. 104, 32 I.L.M. 296, 297-98 (1993). However, such a clause would not seem to cover the
problem of possible WTO violation by restrictions on non-participants.
97. WTO Agreement, supra note 5.
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written in 1947), this time, not by the WTO judiciary, but by the WTO
membership itself. This was a rare opportunity that was missed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The WTO decision to explicitly permit trade restrictions on dia-
monds from countries not participating in the Kimberley scheme set up
to stop the traffic in conflict diamonds is, at first glance, a welcome sign
that the WTO cares not only about free trade. Upon reflection, however,
the WTO waiver may do more harm than good.
Firstly, there are strong arguments indicating that WTO rules as they
stood already justified the restrictions at issue. Hence, granting a waiver
has the potential of undermining future trade restrictions imposed for
humanitarian purposes if such is done in the absence of a waiver.
Secondly, the Kimberley scheme itself and, in particular, the UN Se-
curity Council resolutions that support it are, like the WTO, part of
international law. Hence, why was there a need to reconfirm in the WTO
what was already decided in other fora? This hints at a certain superior-
ity complex currently in vogue at the WTO. At the same time, however,
the diamond waiver only relates to trade with non-participants in the
Kimberley scheme. It could, therefore, be argued that between Kimber-
ley participants it was thought that any WTO violation would anyhow be
justified with reference to the Kimberley scheme itself. Hence, between
participants no waiver was needed. If this interpretation is correct, the
limited scope of the waiver constitutes an important recognition that the
WTO-including its dispute settlement mechanism-will take account
also of non-WTO instruments, in casu the Kimberley scheme and related
UN resolutions, even in the absence of an applicable waiver.
EPILOGUE
From April 28-30, 2003, the by then extended group of 52 Partici-
pants in the Kimberley scheme held a plenary session in Johannesburg,
South Africa. Crucially for the implementation of the scheme, a Partici-
pation Committee was established with the task of determining which of
the countries that adopted the scheme effectively complied with its mini-
mum requirements, i.e., enacted the laws and regulations required under
the scheme to ensure proper certification.9 On July 31, 2003, a list of 40
98. Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting, Johannesburg Final Communique (April 28-
30, 2003), at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/news/documents.asp?d=51 (last visited Sept.
16, 2003). Interestingly, the Participation Committee (PC) consists of six countries and the
European Communities as well as two NGOs and one industry organization. The PC reviews
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countries was released.99 As of August 31, 2003, only these countries are
regarded as Participants in the scheme. All trade in rough diamonds with
countries not on this list is considered as trade with non-Participants and
must be banned. Importantly, 24 countries that had adopted the scheme
did not make the list.
This peculiar implementation mechanism has an important conse-
quence for the thesis in this Article. So far, we assumed that all countries
that adopted the Kimberley scheme would be seen as Participants in it.
However, with the new list of 40 countries, even countries that adopted
the scheme have now been classified as non-Participants-subject to a
complete embargo on rough diamonds-on the ground that they failed to
meet the minimum requirements in the scheme. This means that there
are now two classes of non-Participants: (1) countries that never adopted
the scheme in the first place (that is, the class of non-Participants envis-
aged in this Article); and (2) countries that adopted the scheme but did
not make the short-list of 40 countries.
When it comes to the trade embargo to be imposed on the latter
class of non-Participants, the arguments made in Section III:B in support
of WTO consistency based on explicit WTO exceptions themselves con-
tinue to apply. In addition, however, for this second class of non-
Participants also the arguments in Section III:C apply, that is, even if the
embargo were not justified under WTO rules as such, the Kimberley
scheme-as a system of international law that was explicitly adopted by
these non-Participants-must offer an independent defense against any
claim of WTO violation. As a result, as much as there was no need to
adopt a WTO waiver for trade restrictions as between Kimberley Partici-
pants, no WTO waiver was needed either for restrictions imposed on the
non-Participants that adopted the Kimberley scheme but were subse-
quently found not to meet minimum requirements. This new
development adds to the argument made in the Article that the WTO
waiver was not necessary and may undermine the WTO consistency of
similar trade restrictions where no waiver was granted. At the same time,
it may also weaken the other argument made in the Article, namely that
WTO members considered that trade restrictions as between countries
that adopted the Kimberley scheme would be covered and justified by
relevant legislation and makes its recommendation to the Chair of the Kimberley scheme who,
in the end, is left with the final decision to accept or decline an application for Participant
status.
99. See Press Release, Global Witness Ltd., Kimberley Process Finally Agrees Mem-
bership List But Lack Of Monitoring Undermines Credibility (July 31, 2003), at
http://www.globalwitness.org/press-releases/display2.php?id=214 (last visited Sept. 16,
2003). This list is under continuous review and is likely to be expanded as soon as other coun-
tries have adopted the required legislation.
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the Kimberley scheme itself (even if they otherwise violate WTO rules)
so that, for these restrictions, there was no need for a waiver. To that ex-
tent, the WTO superiority complex may not be overcome after all.
